Theory of differing local and national voter choice
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document in English
psychology
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published 16/07/2008
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Summary
This paper aims to critique Downs’s Economic Theory of Political Action in Democracy with experimental research that supports and refutes the assumptions and results of his model. First, I look at if legislators’ policy making decisions are ideologically fixed or susceptible to constituent preferences. Next, I consider if voter choice in incumbency races is dependant on the incumbent’s performance during their previous term. Then I examine the rationality of voting, specifically the assumption that all voters are self interested. Based on my findings in these areas I conclude that there are different mechanisms for local election and national elections.
Table of Contents
- Introduction.
- The effect of voter preference on legislator policy decisions - 2003 California Recall.
- Do the voters actually care about past performance?
- The 2000 school board election in South Carolina.
- Downs's theory on the rationality of being informed.
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